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I. WHY WE WORRY ABOUT THE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
FUTURE Now
Every enterprise ought to be known for its purposes. Anyone,
therefore, writing about the future of environmental and energy law needs
to start with definitions. Otherwise, any expression on the subject will
lack precision and be incapable of sustaining critical scrutiny.
First, what is the future? Is it our own tomorrow or is it Buck Rogers'
twenty-fifth century? For some time now, writing about the future has
been affected with millenarian bias. The year 2000 has acquired a terminal
character. It has become the goal to be reached, as if it represented a safe
harbor to time travellers. The year 2000 has such a reality only in the
social consequences of believing it to possess finality. Far more
significant, of course, is that it will be only one more in the flux of years.
It is hard to conceive of the future in any specific way in terms of more
than decades. Even when speculative philosophers such as Saint Thomas
More have sought a further view, they have carried into that intended
distance the attributes of their own time. Utopia remains firmly a part of
Tudor England and will forever be an idealist's impression of what the
sixteenth century might have been in northwestern Europe.
Every generation sees the future in its own present terms. Insofar as
the energy future is concerned for currently high-energy demandant
practices, there is likely to be a glut of energy sources until the mid-1980s.
This abundance will encourage even heavier reliance upon those energy
sources and an increased growth in gross energy usage. Such conditions
will provide a situation ill-suited to the sharp contraction in energy sources
that now seems probable for the quarter-century following 1985.
The post-1985 period of energy shortage, either absolute or in terms
relative to demand, may then be followed after 2025 by a steady increase in
energy supply throughout the remainder of the twenty-first century. This
increase could result from developments in solar, hydro, and other as yet
unperceived power sources. As for the time beyond the twenty-first
century, the supply of energy may be merely a matter of a minor technical
fix or there may be a social collapse precipitated by some unreasonable
energy or environmental problem.2
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1. Father Copleston called More's Utopia "a conservative book . .. [that] anticipated some
ideas which reappear in... modern socialism." F. COPLESTON, 3 A HISTORY OF PitLOSOV'HY IT. 2, at
134 (1963).
2. As Alvin M. Weinberg has said on this last point: "Should we be successful in developing
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As has always been the case, the future for energy and the
environment lacks an ease of exact prediction. What does seem
predictable is the continuing demand for high levels of energy supply, the
continuing reliance of the current social structure upon the maintenance of
a high supply of energy, and the continuing series of crises in finding or
sustaining the sources of that supply.3  Many predictions will be made
about the outcome of each of these that go far beyond the capacity of a
lawyer to judge. What a lawyer can predict with accuracy is that the legal
system will be intimately involved in all of this, at every stage, from
tomorrow, to the twenty-first century, and beyond.
But for even the furthest seeing and most concerned of today's active
lawyers, the future can scarcely extend more than a half-century, that is,
until the middle part of the twenty-first century. It is to this time frame
that most predictions about law will be tied. The further past 2030 that
predictions are attempted, the more any lawyer's value in making
predictions must diminish. And past some undefined point, today's
forward-looking lawyer must hope future generations will find sufficient
resources and the will to manage them, in order that affluence may remain
a continuous possibility. It is hard enough to provide for this generation's
legal needs, as well as for those pressing on the social horizon, without
taking on the burdens of far-away centuries.4 Indeed, there are those who
urge eschewing any thought of the future. Either necessity will mother
invention or it will not. In either case only strangers will be involved.
Yet if there is to be interest in the future, it will recognize the
intertwining of energy and the environment, for each is interleaved with
the other. For how could there be much urgency in considering the distant
future, if the world has a certainty for both an unending energy supply and
an environment inexhaustible regardless of the demands laid upon it?
There would then be a justified indifference to the future. If such
conditions prevailed, one would have to argue that the future should be put
out of the contemporary mind. 5
If one could be certain that terrible events involving energy and the
environment would not occur for centuries, it would be improbable that
anyone could build a public opinion to prevent those terrible events from
inexhaustible energy sources, our underlying rationale for conserving energy would shift from the
present first-order concern over dwindling fuel resources to less tangible issues: subtle environmental
effects, capital expenditures, or even social risks, such as proliferation, that some inexhaustible energy
sources may entail." Weinberg, Reflections on the Energy Wars, 66 A.IERICAN SCIENTIST 153, 154
(1978).
3. Yet Eric Hirst persuasively argues that growth in energy use could be reduced nearly to zero
through the year 2000. Hirst, Residential Energy Use Alternatives: 1976 to 2000, 194 SCIENCE 1247
(1976).
4. For a book casting boldly ahead in this regard, see S. BROWN, N. CORNE.L, L FADiA%' & E.
WEISS, REGIMES FOR THE OCEAN, OUTER SPACE, AND THE WEATHER (1977).
5. See W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUtION (1974),reviewedin
Junger, Book Review, 37 OHIO ST. LJ. 965 (1976). See also Beckerman, The ,11yth of "Finite"
Resources, Bus. & Soc'y REv., No. 12, at 21 (1975).
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happening. The public might even believe future troubles to be a
certainty, failing some preventive measures, and still be immobilizable in
taking those measures. They would ask: Why struggle to prevent a harm
from happening hundreds of years hence?
This is the likeliest explanation for humanity's historic indifference to
environmental harm. The indifference has been particularly strong when
coupled, as so often has been the case, with a sense of technologic
incapacity and popular fatalism.6  For this proposition, there are two
examples, among many, to be taken from history.
First, Plato's Criteas clearly delineated the importance of forests for
the maintenance of soil values, ground water, stream flow and clarity,
rainfall, moisture retention, and avoidance of erosion. But the loss of all
those good consequences did not befall those who first cut the trees. The
ultimate losses they imposed upon later generations by the act of
deforestation were their current profits. Why, therefore, should the tree
cutters deny themselves the immediate benefit of either the past's stored
wealth or the ultimate losses to be suffered by others?
7
Second, long before the great thirteenth century Mongol invasions of
the Middle East, it was evident that soil productivity was declining.
Irrigation continued for as much as 5,000 years had leached out minerals
and deposited salts. Yet wealth still flowed, as immemorially it had
flowed. If the amount was less, why worry? It was still enough. Then
came the desert Mongols, smashing the ailing irrigation system,
interdicting the flow of both water and wealth. The regional population
dropped ninety percent in a generation.8 Even with the petrochemical
wealth of the twentieth century, one could scarcely say there had been a
comparable recovery in that area despite the passage of more than seven
hundred years.
The purpose of mentioning these events in ecologic history is twofold.
First, they illustrate the present indifference of any generation to the
probability of the future suffering of much later generations. Second, they
are indicative of the fixed belief in the perpetual future existence of what
each generation has experienced historically.
But history is not compelled to justify either human indifference or
expectations. There is always the chance that disaster is not in the far
future but looms in immediate prospect. Disaster may be, ultimately, the
consequence of past and present actions.
6. J. HUGHEs, ECOLOGY IN ANCIENT CIVILIZATION 147-56 (1975).
7. The CRITEAS is quoted and discussed in H. PEREIRA, LAND UE AND WATER RESOURCLS 26
(1973).
8. It is hard to be precise about this. When Hulagu ordered all inhabitants of Baghdad slain in
1258, he killed 800,000 people. When Timur ordered all the inhabitants of Baghdad slain in 1398, he
was only able to kill 90,000 people. See P. BRENT, GENGItIS KIIAN: TIlE RISE. AUtIIORITY AND
DECLINE OF MONGOL POWER 139,235 (1976). Furthermore, during this period there had been a flight
to the towns and rural depopulation. Id. at 190.
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What a culture has been historically conditioned to consider
permanent may become a transient historic event. It is the assertion of
this transiency of the apparently permanent that has produced our current
concern for the "future." It is not that the environment may fail two
centuries forward in time or that the energy supply may run out in 2200
A.D. that evokes concern. It is, instead, the chance either or both could
happen before the talismanic year 2000 that exercises the imaginations of
contemporaries.9
Sentencing a man to be hanged tends powerfully to focus his mind,
whatever general views on his mortality he otherwise might hold.
Something not too dissimilar seems to have happened to this generation.
And just as lawyers know that a capital sentence can be overturned, so
also do they know that capital sentences have been executed. In the light
of such knowledge, a counsel of "don't fret" to those on death row would
have an air of frivolity not suited to the circumstances.
II. LIMITLESS DEMAND AND THE PROSPECT OF LIMITATIONS
FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Aristotle believed that resources within nature were limited and that
the totality of wealth was not to be increased. There could be a
redistribution-between peoples or among individuals-but there could
not be a surging increase in what was available in nature for distribution.
Such ideas were not of his invention but were commonly held long before
his time.'0
Events in the ancient world subsequent to the death of Aristotle
seemed only to confirm the rightness of these views. The natural resources
of the Mediterranean Basin, the homeland of classic European thought,
shrank. The fiscal wealth of the region declined with the fall of Rome and
the breakup of the classic ecumene that had stretched from the Irish Sea to
the Indus Valley." Only in the eighteenth century did events occur in
northwestern Europe that laid the bases for a long-term challenge to such
an ancient tradition.
The Industrial Revolution arrived in the eighteenth century,
introducing the flow of the energy cascades that have constantly
9. Daniel H. Herring says:
Under natural resource limitations and environmental pressures, this attitudinal cir-
cumstance may undergo a reorientation toward quality and survival, e.g., energy crises. This
is particularly true with the scarcity concept in operation, where several economic institutions
are in competition for the allocation of environmental segments. Ecological inter-
dependencies and the environmental cost of negative influences may then complicate the
economic-environmental system.
D. HERRING, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION 7 (1974).
10. Sibly, The Relevance of Classical Political Theoryfor Econonky; Technology. andEcology.
2 ALTERNATIVES, PERSPECTIVES FOR SOCIETY AND TIlE ENVIRONMENT, No. 2. at 14 (1973).
1I. SHEPARD, MAN IN THE LANDSCAPE: A HISTORIC VIEW OF TIlE ES THETicS OF NATURE 73-74
(1967). Others insist the ecologic factor in forming patterns of civilization is negligible. P. SCREcKER,
WORK AND HISTORY: AN ESSAY ON THE SSTRUCTURE OF CIVILIZATION 307 (1948).
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accelerated from that time forward. Within fewer than one hundred years
from the application of steam to industrial production, Adam Smith felt
himself justified to talk about the creation of wealth. The provision of
energy for turning the wheels first of factories and then of steam trains
seemed to sweep away all the limitations that previously had appeared
immovable.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx could write about
the wonders of capitalism, its creation of riches, its releases of energy, its
development of problem-solving technology.12  The only difficulties
remaining lay in how to better share this new wealth, how to prevent the
capitalist system creating this wealth from binding up because of alleged
compaction in the holding of wealth, and how to step up the rate of this
wealth's creation. The ancient philosophers who had described their
limited world could step aside and leave the future to engineers and capital
managers. On this much, Adam Smith and Karl Marx could agree.
Not that agreement with them was unanimous. The Physiocrats
insisted all wealth, coming from land, suffered the limitations of its source.
Malthus argued that population, if not controlled in its growth, must
inevitably exceed the ability of natural resources to sustain the human
pressure.' 3 Others, impressed with the loss of energy promised by the
discovery of the Second Law of Thermodynamics-a marriage of the ideas
of Malthus with those of Sadi Carnot-argued that the rise in the energy
curve had to produce the energy death.14 Even at the peak of optimism
that marked the arrival of the twentieth century, there came pessimists
claiming that the ancient philosophers had been right: nature was limited;
human capacity was not creative, but transformative only; and all growth
must eventually reach the inflexible limits of an unexpandable nature.
But the pessimists could find few to listen prior to 1970. Why, indeed,
should anyone have been impressed by the cogency of what the pessimists
had to say? Stirring events held greater persuasion. What proved to be
most impressive of all were the numerous general wars of the twentieth
century. They seemed to show that the only limits to sources of energy, or
to resources for materials, or to the environment as a receptor, could be
found in human willingness to invest in what was needed to remove forever
what formerly had been the old immutable barriers.1 5
12. William McNeill calls this "an intellectual error common to Marxian dogmatists, nine-
teenth-century liberals, and twentieth-century conservatives." McNEIIL, TlE RisE OF TIlE WEsT. A
HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY 734 (1963).
13. An interesting study by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, prepared for a project directed by
Giacomo Becattini, interconnects Adam Smith, Francois Quesnay, Karl Marx (and, by implication,
Thomas Malthus) as "physiological" economists as opposed to later "mechanistic" economists. N.
GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC MYTHS: INSTITUTIONAL AND ANALYTICAL ECONOMIC
ESSAYS 237-42 (1976).
14. See Bruce Hannon's delightful "Energy Use and Moral Restraint, wherein are contrasted the
views of the Economist and the Engineer on the use of the finite resources," to be published in the J. or
SOC. & BIOLOGICAL STRUCTURES.
15. These ideas are set forth in ALBRECHT-CARRIE, THE MEANING OF TIE FIRST WORLD WAR Vi-
vii (1965).
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In 1914, armies went to war primarily on mule power. Aircraft were
toys. Nitrates still came only from Chile. By 1918, the automotive power
of the gasoline and diesel engines predicted transportation for succeeding
decades. The first regularly scheduled international carriage of commer-
cial passengers (from Vienna to Kiev in 1918) having been established, it
was evident the airplane had ceased to be a toy. As for nitrates, they came
from the air as well as from Chile. People, therefore, could simultaneous-
ly lament the horrors of war and praise the blessings brought forth by that
convulsion.
World War II simply carried on this convention. Yes, the rocket
attacks had been terrible; but the knowledge they required made space
travel a later possibility. Of course, those atom bombs caused dreadful
suffering; but then they had made possible access to the energy of the atom
for peaceful uses. It was "swords into plowshares," as ever it had been.
War had once again revealed opportunities humanity had been too timid,
or unimaginative, or cheap to seek.
Particularly too cheap. One of the facts the wars seemed to reveal
was the plentiful supply of capital for any purpose man set his will to
accomplish. All the cheese-paring old fogies from before the war, or later
from between the wars, who had prated about "can't afford" or "too
expensive," seemed to have been effectively silenced. For any important
wartime purpose, there proved to be plenty of capital to spend, to waste,
and to leave as an unexpended surplus. The only limitation lay in the
forcefulness of the human will. A boundary turned out to be only one
more frontier.
6
By the middle of the twentieth century, the common wisdom asserted
the limitless capacity of nature to satisfy human demand, claimed that it
was quite right for human demand to be conceptually limitless, and felt
assured that energy and capital would alike always be available limitlessly
to respond to any demand made upon them throughout eternity. Upon
these premises, population, energy conversion, materials usages, and
capital investment surged forward at a pace not even the free-spending
great wars of the century had matched. The great secret of universal
affluence reputedly had been found. It was only a matter of time before
the lapping waves of rising wealth would gently inundate the lands of all
people and float their rising numbers into a happy future.
The first modern voices to doubt such cheerful prophecy were those
who insisted the world could not support a rate of population increase such
as marked the twentieth century. For puzzling reasons, world population
growth rates had taken off on a sharply rising curve in the seventeenth
16. A book in this mold is W. HOTCHKISS, MINMALS OF MIGnT (1945), much ofuhich is his
"winning" argument against Messieurs Manager, Superintendent, Lawyer, Banker, and President.
17. One example of many optimistic appraisals is in Seaborg, Science. Technology, and the
Citizen, in IT'S NOT Too LATE 153 (F. Carvell & M. Tadlock eds. 1971).
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century, just prior to a similar steep rise in the rates of applied energy
usage. By the mid-twentieth century, however, the number of years
required for doubling total world population had shrunk to frightening
brevity. Whatever numbers the world might support-even as many as
fifty billion on the minimum subsistence that number would seem to
impose-the time for getting there had a contracted prospect to it that
alarmed those expressipg their dismay over population growth. They
claimed any course less than zero population growth would be inadequate
to avoid the impending catastrophe.18
The next voices of alarm were concerned about the pollution of the
environment. They noted the declining quality of air and water, the drop
in certain bird and fish populations, and the concentration through soil
and the food chain of contaminants that imperiled all living organisms in
the chain. New chemicals were now released with which previous
evolution had conferred no genetic experience. The least effect would be
cancer, the most extensive change the alteration of the characteristics of
future generations. Alarmed by these visions, these persons were impelled
to warn about human activity that threatened slow or rapid biocide on the
planet.19
And then came the alarmed voices to talk about shortages-of
materials, of energy supplies, of capital. They insisted that the lack of
materials could not be met by shifting usage from one complementary
substance to another, or by taking lower and lower grades of some
particular mineral from nature, or by recycling the used stuff back into the
process. In the presence of open-ended demand, these would prove
palliatives only. More pressing would be the shortage of oil, with an
exhaustion of fossil fuels. And most pressing of all would be the lack of
capital to cover the costs of shifting from mineral to mineral, of going from
fossil fuel to nuclear power, of conserving in order to extract greater use
from everything, and of minimizing the deleterious effect of every human
action upon everything living or renewable within nature.
Finally in this chorus of alarm came those who put together all these
varying sources of fear. Thereby were inaugurated discussions of a crisis
of crises. Most closely associated in the popular mind with the Club of
Rome, these are the people who applied a systems aralysis to the alarms of
18. One of the first modern writers to express concern with population was William Vogt,
especially his PEOPLE! CHALLENGE TO SURVIVAL (1960), but the most influential book was P. EIIIHul,
THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
19. Many could be cited. The most significant for broad-scale criticism is B. COi ONLR, TIIE
CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN AND TECHNOLOGY (1971); but see also such representative works as B.
BRODUER, ASBESTOS AND ENZYMES (1972); K. MONTAGUE & P. MONTAGUE, MERCURY (1971); J.
TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST (1970).
20. Again one of the early contemporary writers expressing these fears was W. VOoT, ROAD TO
SURVIVAL(1948). Another was F. OSBORN, OUR PLUNDERED PLANET (1948). Other important early
works in this genre were P. SEARS, DESERTS ON THE MARCH (1935), which had an impact far beyond its
immediate subject, and C. FURNAS, THE NEXT HUNDRED YEARS: THE UNFINISIED BUSINESS OF SCIENCE
(1936).
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others. They sought to integrate what had before seemed separate facts
into a comprehensive picture of likely future events, should present
practices in greater or lesser degree be extrapolated forward. In none of
the scenarios that they cast was there an optimistic glow. Instead, there
were predictions ranging from a future of dour frugality to one of outright
disaster, should present practices be continued.21
The philosophical position of Aristotle had been rediscovered. The
idea, so prevalent in economic circles from before Ricardo, that free goods
existed in nature, was rejected by many, if not by most. The phrase,
"There is no such thing as a free lunch," was repeated to the point of nausea
among many hearing it, although not to the extent that there appeared any
loss of appetite. Many, who had in the 1950s been certain that technology
and the fine tuning of the economists had amply provided for their
personal futures, now began to doubt if they had much of a profitable
future left to enjoy, much less to pass on.22
What seems to have been rediscovered is the prospect of varying
boundaries to expansion-of population, of capital, of energy, of
materials. All rising curves, with possibly one exception, ultimately are
expected to become sigmoid. Growth cannot be sustained forever in a
near-vertical trajectory. The one implicitly asserted exception, so
strongly asserted over the past two hundred years, has been that of hu-
man demand. 3
Demand has now been freed for some decades from need. When
high-energy or high-capital intensive societies today invoke "need," they
refer to whatever must be mobilized to sustain some growth curve's rise.
Necessity now seems to mean maintaining rising curves of growth.
Often, for many, necessity even means increasing them.24
Aristotle believed that there were limits to human need which
humanity would recognize. Karl Marx still believed it. But that was
before a society appeared based upon growth.25
When growth became a necessity, how could need thereafter be
defined? Even if it were called "subsistence," it would be for the
21. D. H. MEADOWS, D. L. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS, & W. BEHIRENS, TIE LIMrTSr TO GROWTI
THE FIRST REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME (1972); M. MESAROVIC & E. PEsTEL, MANKIND AT TIlE
TURNING POINT- THE SECOND REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME (1974); J. TINBERGEN, A. DOLMfAN., & J.
VAN ETTINGER, RIO: RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: TIlE THIRD REPORT TO TIlE CLUB OF
ROME (1976). An important work for all this is J. FORRESTER, WORLD DYNAMICS (1971).
22. Who popularized the "free lunch" parable? In my opinion, it was the biologist Barry
Commoner and the economist Milton Friedman-for very different purposes, one must add. As to
why nature is not a free good, see E. MURPHY, GOVERNING NATURE 138-70 (1967).
23. On this role of the sigmoid-in this case an S-curve, see S. CIHASE, THE MOST PROBABLE
WORLD 18-19 (1968).
24. Paul Henshaw calls this relationship the"demand for and the price of Utopia." P. HENSIIAW,
THIS SIDE OF YESTERDAY: EXTINCTION OR UTOPIA 148 (1971).
25. One view of why Marx did not account for growth can be found in N. GEORGE5Cu-ROEGEN,
THE ENTROPY LAW AND THE ECONOMIC PROCESS 262-75 (1971). Marx, of course, recognized that "the
means of want satisfaction can change with time and place: the human species would have long since
vanished had our wants been rigid like a number." Id. at 63.
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subsistence of growth. Under such a social condition, any ophelimity
limit must have been swept away. Planned obsolescence would become
more of a social value than planned protracted utility.26 A world certainly
had been created that denied the validity of Aristotle's recognition of
demand limits to be found in human need.
Yet was Aristotle more mistaken here than in his belief in nature's
limited wealth? Is the rise in human demand to be the only curve that can
fly upward forever? Can nothing external to it flatten or depress it?
One must conclude that there is a likelihood that external forces exist
to limit demand. The human will that is instigative of soaring demand is
strong. It does not, however, function in a universe capable of forever
yielding to its pressuring force. For that reason, sigmoid curves for rising
growth will prove inclusive for the curve of human demand.
Of course the alarums may be a bit premature. What humanity can
do to nature still has a miniature quality compared to the energy of the sun,
or the exhalations of the world's vegetation, or the life-force of microbiota.
But the world's population continues to contract the doubling time of its
numbers. The dependence on fossil fuels grows more, not less, intense.
The use of resources grows multiply. The impacts on renewing systems
in the environment increase in severity. The worrisome character of all
this can only become evident when open-ended demand is seen as
occurring in a world of inexpandible limitations.
It has been apward of two centuries now since many would
confidently insist that nature offered limits to human demand. Certainly
few have seen limitations that technology could not overcome. The
common belief in the creation of new wealth seemingly guarantees
sufficient capital to invest for eliminating any barriers the world could ever
pose.27
Fairly abruptly there have now appeared persons quite confident in
their assertions of limitation. They are convinced that Aristotle was more
right than he was wrong. They insist that the vast change in conditions
since his time has only produced conditions of ineluctable proof.28
They understand that the scope of nature was not as contracted as
Aristotle believed, but they insist limitations do exist. Ironically, the
evidence for the limitation has been made, in their view, both by the
intensity of human demand and by the human ingenuity in meeting it. Yet
somewhere down the way the limits are certain to be there, they insist.21
And it is out of this firm belief that a goodly portion of today's action
26. J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 116-19 (3d rev. ed. 1976).
27. An influential and serious writer who has expressed this View is Peter Drueker. In P.
DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER (1950), energy and environmental
constraints are simply absent.
28. W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: PROLOGUE TO A POLITICAL TIIotRY OF
THE STEADY STATE (1977).
29. D. MEADOWS, ALTERNATIVES TO GROWTH-I: A SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURtS (1977),
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arises on behalf of the energy and environmental future. There is simply a
declining faith in the boundlessness of nature. In its stead is more of the
old Aristotelian conviction in the finiteness of all things.
III. THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
AND ENERGY CONCERNS
To insist that nothing happened prior to 1970 concerning environ-
mental protection and energy conservation would disserve many people
and several significant events. The decade of the 1960s was one of
increasing awareness of the impact of human activity on the renewing
environment. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring could be received with
contempt and obliquity on its appearance in 1962, yet within a handful of
years much of its content was accepted wisdom.30  People and events
changed rapidly during the years of the'60s and established a progression
of differences about the way the environment and energy would be
regarded. It is a progression that has been subsequently accelerated.
Perhaps fortuitously, the significant legislation and legal activity
began emerging with the advent of the 1970s. When the National
Environmental Policy Act was signed on New Year's Day, 1970, a
symbolic event had occurred for both the United States and the world .3
Modern man puts a stress upon the passage of years and assigns his
highest social value to whatever can be called new. Hence the utility of
identifying the legal activity protective of the environment with a fresh
decade, the Decade of the Environment.
One could not claim the same in 1970 insofar as legislation for energy
conservation was concerned. King Hubbert, it is true, had already issued
his restricted predictions of the fossil fuel resources.32  Others had
ascertained that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) had been moved by events into the position of a natural
producers' cartel whose prices might never again be tumbled down as they
had been in the past. But these persons attracted little attention among
the drafters and passers of new laws.33
It was this absence of new laws, of a change of attitude reflected on the
statute books, that is the point. There existed a legally established energy
policy in countries like the United States that was decades old by 1970. At
the very time that environmentally protective legislation had started to
30. For the importance of this work, see P. BROOKS, TiE HOUSE OF LIFE: RAcIlEL CARSON AT
WORK (1972).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347 (1970). See Anderson, 77Te National Environmental Poioy Act, in
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
32. M. King Hubbert's first examination of fossil fuels in a time perspective -as his article
Hubbert, Energy From Fossil Fuels, 109 SCIENCE 103 (1949). See his later article, Hubbert, U.S.
Energy Resources, A Review as of 1972, in U.S. ENERGY RESOURCES: A REVIEW AS OF 1972 (1974).
33. R. MANCKE, SQUEAKING BY: U.S. ENERGY POLICY SINCE THE E.NARGo (1976) deals With
OPEC's development, effect, and likely future.
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emerge in this country, the policy for energy use remained at open
throttle.34
Some environmentalists even thought it possible to solve many
environmental problems easily with the applications of still greater energy
cascades. Many others-perhaps most-had a blissful unawareness of
how high an energy demand environmental protection would impose.
Environmental protection and energy conservation were not walking
hand-in-hand through the legislative process at the start of the 1970s. a5
Not until 1973, with the occurrence of the Arab oil embargo and the
soaring rise in the price of a barrel of oil, was it made plain that energy, too,
was in a present crisis.36 What also became cruelly clear at that moment
was the extent to which several conditions had become commonplace after
1945: (1) the rise throughout the world in energy demand, but most
particularly the rise in countries that already had a tradition of high levels
of energy rise; (2) the shift from reliance on coal and wood (or other cur-
rent sources for energy) to dependence upon oil and natural gas; (3)
the increased use of oil and gas, as compared to coal or hydropower, for the
manufacture of electricity, along with the increased employment of
electricity to heat or to cool space; (4) the diminishing importance of
railways for the carriage of passengers and freight, accompanied by
enormously expanded reliance upon gasoline or diesel-powered motor
traffic to do the job; (5) the expectancies that fossil-fueled energy would be
forthcoming, cheap, plentiful, and hence a kind of release for whatever
made either labor or capital intensive; (6) a relatively greater dependency
upon more highly centralized or localized organizations of energy
supplies; and (7) the near total reliance for continued social tranquility, or
even survival, upon the maintenance of open-ended growth in energy
supplies.3
7
An expectation had also been encouraged during the same period of
time that mankind could expect an easy transition of the energy supply
from fossil fuels to nuclear power. Somewhere ahead in a not very
specified future, fissioned uranium, the breeder reactor, and the fusion
process would successively replace previous energy sources and simultane-
ously step up the flow of the energy cascades.38 The wise energy planner
34. This is exemplified by the varying energy forecasts applying between 1960 and 1975. See
SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND POWER, HousE INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE Comm,, H. R, Doc.
No. 77, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, Appendix, Table 1, 7 (1976).
35. Sophisticated persons did see the relationship. A. KNEEsE, R. AYRES & R. D'ARO,
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MATERIALS BALANCE APPROACH 17-28 (1970).
36. OPEC's earlier actions, however, had indicated what was coming. See remarks of Akins,
Energy, the Environment and Our Society, Symposium held at The Ohio State University sponsored
by the Battelle Endowment Program (Feb. 28, 1977).
37. Fred Cottrell was one of the first to make many of these points. F. COTrRELL, ENEROY AND
SOCIETY: THE RELATION BETWEEN ENERGY, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1955).
38. Many still see the problems of nuclear power to arise externally to the ability of the nuclear
process to safely provide commercial uses. The Study Group on Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Waste
Management, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: An Appraisal, PHYSICS TODAY, October 1977, at 32,
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had become one who saw the future in terms of energy demand doubling in
a generation. This wise planner insisted on demand being necessarily met
or surpassed by supply. A smooth technical transfer to different sources
for booming energy conversions was the only possible alternative should
traditional fossil fuels decline in availability.
The 1970s have not proven a kindly time for either such traditions or
such expectations. The first result of the 1973 OPEC oil action was to
show energy to be no longer cheap nor a substitute for labor or capital.
Nations learned that their future plans had to be redrawn because,
whatever its cost, they were dependent upon the maintenance of high
energy flow. A world structure had been created throughout the twentieth
century that was meant to be sustained by energy cascades. Neither a
shortage of foreign exchange nor a competition for the use of capital could
stand in the way of satisfying such demands. Wise planning had become
very hard to define.39
The world, therefore, was thrust abruptly into an energy conscious-
ness, as compared to the gradual development of an environmental
consciousness.40 When the twentieth century began, the renewing
environment of air, water, and the biomass was not only regarded as a
storehouse of goods freely supplied by Mother Nature. The renewing
environment was also regarded as endlessly able to renew itself and as
being ultimately beyond the reach of human activity to irreversibly effect
adversity. The image posited was man remaining small at the fecund side
of Nature.
Even so, there already existed in 1900 a small but vibrant movement
concerned with the conservation of nature. Out of this movement had
come the efforts to restock streams with fish, to replant deforested woods,
to limit the numbers of grazing animals on the range, and to restore eroded
soil values. Already, people asserted that there were circumstances in
which human activity could impose sufficient pressure that, if left
unrelieved, could result in permanent harm. Steadily throughout the
twentieth century, based upon this knowledge of at least the locally
destructive capacity of human activity, the environmental movement
expanded its dual conviction of a human ability to impose destruction
upon nature's renewing powers and a human capacity to help nature
sustain those same powers for renewal.4'
39. An interesting report on this is International Economic Policy Ass'n, Perspectives on the
National Energy Plan: A Mid-Course Appraisal (Sept. 1977).
40. As Kenneth Boulding puts it:
While it seems highly probable that at the present low price of energy, both supply and
demand over the next generation or so will be highly elastic, we may then easily move into a
price range where inelasticity sets in; if this is short of what would be required for continued
world expansion of per capita real income, we could be in for a very rough time.
Boulding, Determinants of Energy Strategies, in FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR ENERGY DVE oPtE.N . A
QuESTIoN OF SCALE 14, 29 (1977).
41. For the course of the American development in the conservation of nature, see TjIE
AMEicAN ENvIRONMENT. READINGS IN A HISTORY OF CONSERVATION (R. Nash ed. 1968).
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It was out of such conviction that the Air Quality Act (1970)42 and the
Water Quality Act (1972) 43 emerged in the United States. They were
based upon the same belief in man's responsibilities for his actions and
confidence in his ability to avoid the evil consequences of those same
actions. These beliefs had supported the earlier legislation for desert
reclamation (1902), 44 forestry (1911), 45 soil conservation (1935),46 and
the coordination of fish and wildlife preservation (1958). 41
Whether the belief in such a salvaging capacity is ultimately
supportable, it has long existed; and it has co-existed with the recognition
that the impact of human demand on the renewing environment creates a
need for such conservation. Out of this awareness has developed both the
popular consciousness for environmental protection and the political
bases for the environmentally protective legislation not only of the 1970s
but of previous decades.
This popular concern has not encompassed matters relative to energy,
at least until very recently. Indeed the opposite view has prevailed,
although there have been flurries of energy concern by government in the
past. Sometimes this interest has been based upon a fear that a particular
energy source was failing. More often it has rested upon a desire to
increase the energy supply.
Government's fears of energy shortages were previously allayed by
such events as the conclusions of the 1913 international coal conference
that rejected predictions of imminent coal exhaustion and by the oil
discoveries on the Great Plains in the 1920s. The Great Plains discoveries
put a prompt stop to the progress of oil conservation legislation in the
United States Senate.48  As for the federal responsibility for increases in
energy supply, they made possible such values as "cheap" interstate gas,
low domestic gasoline prices after 1973 relative to world costs, nuclear
42. Pub. L. No.91-604,84 Stat. 1676(1970). The 1970 act amended the Clean Air Act of 1963,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970), as amended by Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat.
485 (1967).
43. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No, 92-500,86 Stat. 816
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1975)).
44. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-616yyyy (1970)).
45. Popularly known as the Weeks Act, Act of Mar. 1, 1911, eh. 186,36 Stat. 963 (amending Act
of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 36 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. chs. 2 & 3 (1970))),
46. Act of April 27, 1935, ch. 85, 49 Stat. 163 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 590a-590q (1970). See H,
BENNETT, SOIL CONSERVATION (1939). The author therein was important in furthering this legislation
and its administration.
47. Pub. L. No. 85-624, 72 Stat. 563 (1958) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-664 (1970)). For a
general discussion of the evolution of wildlife law, see ENVIRONMENTAT. LAW INSTITUTE, COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1977).
48. On coal supplies, see the excerpts from the 1916 address of Frank Short refuting the
predictions of Gifford Pinchot that the world's supply of coal was being rapidly exhausted. Short,
Conservation: Its Purpose, Its Effect, in 2 CONSERVATION IN TIlE UNIrED STATES: MINERALS 675 (F.
Smith gen. ed. & W. Doherty ed. 1971). On the 1920s abundance of oil supplies, see Marland, Future
Oil Supply More Certain Than That of Staple Food Crops, in 2 CONSERVATION IN TIlE UNITED STATES:
MINERALS 146 (F. Smith gen. ed. & W. Doherty ed. 1971).
[Vol. 39:752
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
generating stations resting comfortably on sunk costs, and similar efforts
to keep the energy cascades flowing boundlessly.
Prior to 1970, the common problem for energy throughout the world
seemed to lie more in how to dispose of a glut than how to act in the
presence of a shortage. Due to wartime demand and transportation
difficulties, there were brief periods of energy shortage in 1918 and in 1942-
1945. But these were like impediments in swiftly moving streams: once the
blockage was released, the flow of the energy cascades surged forward with
reinforced strength.
In the United States during much of the time between 1925 and 1970,
the legal mind was focused upon the support of price stability, the
reduction of foreign competition, and the encouragement of domestic
demand. What was the result? Aside from the state conservation laws
designed to prevent destruction of the oil and gas resources in the
extracting process, the legal system was more indifferent than otherwise to
either the efficient use of energy or to any lessened use of energy sources.49
The absence of a long-established, widely based energy conservation
movement has been the consequence. Compare energy conservation with
movements for limiting population or protecting the environment. Atthe
beginning of the twentieth century, the idea of birth control was popularly
associated with anarchists like Emma Goldman, while the protection of
nature was equated with the motto "Save the Fish." Not the best of
beginnings, perhaps, for movements meant to change the world, but far
more than the goal of energy conservation has had behind it. Population
control and environmental protection today possess a tradition spanning
several generations. Alongside their history, energy conservation has
barely started.50
It is odd, therefore, that anyone should be much surprised at the
slowness and the timidity with which energy conservation has been tackled
since 1973. Marxist countries, which have maintained a concerted
opposition to extensive private ownership of automobiles, may have had
the easiest reactive role to play. This is a function less of a command
economy than of low economic dependence upon automobiles.
In the United States, this economic dependence on cars and trucks
may be as much as thirty percent-or it may be far more, when the
economic function of the mobility sustained by the gasoline engine is
49. An interesting survey of historic American experience is M. MERRILL, Tl E Putnc's
CONCERN WITH THE FUEL MINERALS (1960). On the temporary character of wartime controls, see Id. at
91, 102; on price support, see id., at 97-98; on maintaining high domestic production levels, see Id., at
88-89.
50. Admittedly population control measures-especially sterilization and abortion-were slow
to win popular acceptance; but without the work in favor of contraception, these two controversial
methods never would have had a chance. See TOWARD THE END OF GRowTi: POPULATION IN
AMERICA (C. Westoff ed. 1973). The same is true in environmental protection. See National Wild-
life Fed'n, The Foundation of Conservation Education (Pamphlet No. 3 1941).
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included.5' In Western Europe and Japan, the percentages of dependence
on gasoline and diesel are also quite high. Obviously there will be far
greater difficulty instituting energy conservation measures-or en-
vironmentally protective actions-vis-a-vis the car and the truck in
automobile-dependent societies than in societies where a private car is a
rarity and goods are sent by rail.52
Yet all existing economies need to adopt environmentally protective
measures and initiate programs of energy conservation. The need to
redress the balances in nature against the impact of human demand upon
natural systems would alone assure such changes independently of any
difficulty of energy supply. The American air and water quality legislation
of the 1970s is illustrative.
When this legislation was enacted, it was meant to force development
of appropriate technology. Congress knew that the techniques for dealing
with pollution were largely unavailable and, equally significantly, would
never become available in the absence of legal compulsions. The reaction
of many to the new laws was that Congress had made a mistake and, by
overreacting to fads and hysteria, had enacted laws that Congress would
have to repeal.53
In 1977, Congress reviewed what it had done. Some deadlines were
moved back and a very few requirements were modified in the direction of
lowering environmentally protective requirements. But, overwhelmingly,
Congress stood fast and strengthened the environmentally protective
aspects of the federal law.54
At about the same time in 1977, Congress enacted a coal mine
reclamation act that could only be regarded as a further serious federal
commitment to redressing the balance between natural systems and
human demand upon those systems. 5 The mine reclamation act stands
beside such earlier efforts as the previous year's public lands act,6 and the
environmental legislation of the Lyndon Johnson years.57 Even an
51. The importance of the automobile to the American economy was explored by Leventhal, J.,
in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
52. This is why Amory Lovins, a prominent critic of continued reliance on fossil fuels, urges the
rapid development of fluid fuels from current energy sources. Lovins, Soft Energy Technologles, 3
ANN. REV. OF ENERGY 477, 494-95 (1978). I am grateful to Mr. Lovins for allowing me to read his
article in galleys.
53. Then Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans expressed his very negative reaction in a speech
to the Petroleum Council excerpted in the Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1971, at 6, col. 4.
54. Davis, Kurtock, Leape & Magill, The Clean Air Act Amendments of1977: Away ron
Technology-Forcing?, 2 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 1(1977); Lazarus, Nonpoint Source Pollution, 2 HARV.
ENVT'L L. REv. 176 (1977); Voytko, The Clean Water Act and Related Developments in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Program During 1977, 2 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 103 (1977).
55. McDaniel, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: An Analysls, 2 HAiY.
ENVT'L L. REV. 288 (1977), discussing Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (to be codified at 30 U.S.C, §§
1201-1328 (1977)).
56. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2787
(codified at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 687a-687c-1 (1976)).
57. For President Johnson's own appraisal of his environmental legislation, see L. JOHNSON,
THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1963-1969, at 336-39 (1971),
[Vol. 39:752
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
environmental advocate who believed that the effort was inadequate
would have to admit that far more had happened in the American legal
system than most observers in 1960 would have predicted could take place
so soon.
On the energy side, the results have been far more modest. American
efforts have been directed toward imposing energy conservation
requirements on building heating, cooling, and insulation, as well as upon
the fuel demands of vehicles to be produced through the mid-1980ss The
latter would have been required by the amended Clean Air Act standing by
itself.59 Beyond this, legislation has been modest, although growth of the
burgeoning federal energy bureaucracy has been downright immodest
relative to its assigned legal duties.60
The United States, like the rest of the world, has maintained the
demand for incessant growth. Neither the problems of the environment
nor of energy resources have been permitted to alter the will for unlimited
growth, whether one is talking about advanced industrial economies or the
industrially developing economies of the Third World. The world in the
late 1970s may be enduring a recession, imposed by the OPEC-induced
energy crisis, and reducing its rates of growth. But there are very few,
indeed, who would see any silver lining in that cloud. The purpose
everywhere is to raise the rates of growth to previous levels or to exceed
those levels. Compared to this desire, difficulties in the environment or in
61
energy are seen as subordinate.
Those who are dismayed about progress in the United States relative
to environmental protection and energy conservation may be right. The
American economic system has the highest demand for energy and the
greatest impact upon the environment of any in the world. It is toward
American levels that other economies aspire, either generally or with
respect to specific aspects.62 What the United States, therefore, does not
do-or, worse, cannot do-becomes paradigmatic for economies that
operate, or aspire to operate, under similar conditions. The success of
environmental protection and energy conservation in the United States, in
58. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163,89 Stat. 874 (codified at42 U.S.C.
§§ 6201-6422 (1975)); Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-409,88
Stat. 1069 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§5501-5566 (1974)); National Energy Extension Service Act, Pub. L
No. 95-39, 91 Stat. 191 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7001-7011 (1977)).
59. Air Pollution Control Act, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955), as amended bv Act ofJune 22, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 10, 88 Stat. 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7547 (1974)).
60. On the growth of the bureaucracy of the U.S. Department of Energy long before it had
commensurate duties, see Bachman, DOE-Vast New Bureaucracyfor Energy Job,TjiE OILAND GAS
J., Nov. 14, 1977, at 119-25.
61. For a view insistent on the value of growth, see P. PASSELL & L. Ross, TlE RETREAT FRo.Mt
RICHES: AFFLUENCE AND ITS ENEMIES (1973). Many of the critics of current society are viewed as"an
anti-technology wave" that society cannot "countenance." Simon Ramo, Address to the White House
Conference on the Industrial World Ahead, excerpted in the Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1972, at 10, coL4.
62. There is, in some circles, a rising demand forsuch greater equality. Mazrui, The Barrellof
the Gun and the Barrell oj Oil in North-South Equation, 3 ALTRNATIvEs: AJ. OF WORLD POrY 455-79
(1978).
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consequence, has a global importance that many other American actions
cannot possess.63
Given the special significance of American efforts, it is discouraging to
note that other individual countries have certainly done more than the
United States to clean their rivers and their air or to establish energy
efficiencies. But one must recognize that most of their efforts to date have
been smaller in range than the American efforts, either territorially or with
respect to program purpose.64
Britain has cleaner air than in 1960, for example, but Scandinavia has
increased acid rain. Germany has a clean Ruhr river, but the Rhine is
woefully polluted. China has an excellent reforestation, erosion
prevention, and silt control program, but ignores the problems of
industrial air pollution. Russia strenuously focuses on cleaning up Lake
Baikal, but has done little to alleviate the severe pollution of the lower
Volga as it debouches into the Caspian. None of these nations has
undertaken commitments on a par with the continentally inclusive, multi-
purpose programs that the United States has legally imposed for purposes
of protecting the environment and, albeit to a far lesser extent, enhancing
61
energy conservation.
For historic reasons, many high energy using economies have a per
capita demand only half as high as that of the United States. But the
disaggregated character of energy discourages useful comparisons of
energy consumption. For other historic reasons, the intensity of
American energy employment appears comparatively conservative.
Should fossil fuels be approaching exhaustion and should nuclear power
not prove a viable alternative, there is not a single industrially expansive,
energy demanding economy in the world that will be in a position to lecture
the United States for the inadequacies of her performance on either energy
or environmental matters.66
Is all well, then, in the United States? No. The results can only be
called disheartening for conservationists, because environmental protec-
tion and energy conservation have enjoyed very modest success. Motive
and goal are important, but only accomplishment has essential value.
Nature has no awareness of man's intent toward her. What counts is the
actual ability of natural systems to maintain themselves, not humanity's
good wishes on their behalf.
Present energy demands are exhausting the currently exploited
63. Amory Lovins stronbly emphasizes the importance of American action for the world,
Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 65, 90 (1976).
64. An "ecological imperative" has been recognized, however, on an international scale that was
unknown earlier. R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET 21-36 (1971),
65. On experience in environmental protection outside the United States, see ECOLOGY AND
ECONOMICS: CONTROLLING POLLUTION IN TIlE 70s, (M. Goldman ed. 1972); ENVIRONMNLNTAL LAW:
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTs: A SYMPOSIUm (J. Nowak cd. 1976).
66. For extensive international energy comparison, see J. DARMSTADThR, J. DUNKERLLY, & J.
ALTERMAN, How INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES USE ENERGY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1977).
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resources in nature. Benign-and unsuccessful-efforts to moderate
those demands mean very little. The United States' statute books,
administrative manuals, and judicial decisions bulk large at both the state
and federal level. The good intent, at least, is clearly spread out in
American law, however meagre the result.
International conventions for the control of air and water pollution
are becoming common. Europe, under far greater jurisdictional
constraints than North America, has initiated programs to protect the
environment and to conserve energy that may produce more favorable
outcomes than any yet brought forth in the United States. Certainly
segments of Europe can point to individually impressive successes in
environmental protection and energy conservation.67
But, then, so can the United States. And the law's individual
successes in these matters everywhere have not been sufficient. In the
future, isolated actions will prove even less meaningful as the size and
integration of the comprehensive problems concerning energy and the
environment continue what appears at this point to be their inexorable
growth.
Legal systems in the 1970s, both nationally and internationally, have
been moved massively to protect the environment. They have been
altered to conserve energy to an extent that compares favorably with what
had previously been done or might have been thought possible in the prior
decades of the twentieth century. If in these relative terms of our historic
past, one were to enumerate the laws of the 1970s, or the funding, or the
projects undertaken, or the commitments made for actions in the near
future, one might be optimistic. One might believe that a high-energy
demandant society could easily exist in a continuously renewing
environment.68
But in the 1970s nothing else has stood still-not the degradation of
the atmosphere, not the exploitation of materials, not the increase in world
population, not the rising use of water, not the growth in energy demand.69
The law may have run; but it has not even been able to keep pace with the
effects of growth.
Law has been even less restorative of previous deteriorations. It is
not serving as a bar to future crises concerning energy and the environment
that lie on the immediate horizon of the decade of the 1980s. The law, it
seems, has not succeeded in its purposes, although the law of energy
conservation and environmental protection has surely grown.
67. The magazine ENV'L Poi'Y & LAW, sponsored by the International Council on
Environmental Law, has covered international aspects of environmental law since 1975.
68. This belief would partake of what E. J. Mishan calls the "Panglossian effect." Heprobably
would argue that the law is still too "spillover-permissive" and insufficiently "spillover-repressive."
Mishan, Ills, Bads, and Disanienities: The Wages of Growth, in TiE No-GRowrt Socim" 83 (M.
Olson & H. Landsberg eds. 1973).
69. As Tibor Scitovskysays, "Nature, not economics, stands in the way of man's getting his fill of
everything." T. SCITOVSKY, THE JoYLEss EcoNoMY: AN INQUIRY INTo HUMAN SATISFACTION AND
CONSUMER DIssATIsFACriON viii (1976).
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Perhaps this legal swelling is only symptomatic of an age when growth
is expected. Perhaps it is a preliminary activity necessary to the
progression of legal actions that must be initiated and continued
forevermore. But the resulting changes have been insufficient.
No one can look back upon all the legal activity of the 1970s
concerning energy and the environment, and shout, "Stayl Hold!
Enough!" This concerted activity is, at its very best, the end of the
beginning.
IV. THE LEGAL FUTURE CONCERNING ENERGY
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
H.L. Mencken, the professional American critic, once said, "The
prophesying business is like writing fugues: it is fatal to everyone save the
man of absolute genius. The lesser fellow .. . is bound to come to grief
at it.' '70 What is especially daunting about this judgment is that one of the
"lesser fellows," whose prophesying he dismissed, was H.G. Wells. And
the twentieth century has come to regard Wells' predictions for it, made in
1900 in his Anticipations, as accurate to a startling degree.71 If such a
dismissal of H.G. Wells by one of his sharper contemporaries is typical, all
others trying to peer ahead will prove to be very much "lesser fellows."
One might recall, of course, that Mencken himself-after dismissing
Robert Frost, Ezra Pound, E.A. Robinson, Vachel Lindsay, Amy Lowell,
and Edgar Lee Masters as "negligible," "burlesque," "polite," and so
forth-called one Lizette Woodworth Reese the greatest of America's
twentieth century poets. But, then, what comfort is there in knowing that
Mencken, too, was just another prophesying fool?72
When one writes about the future in law concerning energy and
environmental matters, one must keep firmly in mind the extent of the
effect politics will have upon that future.73 To concentrate attention only
upon extensions of existing human demand or upon calculations about
how long that demand can be met out of natural resources is to perpetrate
an important error.74 There is always, for one example, the political
chance of nuclear war, with arsenals whose use must either eliminate life on
the planet or grossly alter it. Viewing nuclear arms as a deterrent one must
70. H. L. MENCKEN, PREJUDICES FIRST SERIES 31 (1919).
71. H. G. WELLS, ANTICIPATIONS OF THE REACTION OF MECHANICAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROORLSS
UPON HUMAN LIFE AND THOUGHT (1902), reprintedfrom 75 FORTNIGHTLY REV. 747,925, 1104 (1901),
76 FORTNIGHTLY REV. 170,355,538,725,911, 1067 (1901), and 172 N. AM. REV. 801 (1901), 173 N. AM.
REV. 56, 263, 401, 554, 694 (1901).
72. H. L Mencken, Critic, in F. HARRIS, CONTEMPORARY PORTRAITS 143,146-49 (4th Ser. 1923),
73. A book that describes this in historic terms within the American experience is F. SMITH, TIlt
POLITICS OF CONSERVATION (1966).
74. As Amory Lovins has said, speaking about energy decisions: "[M]ost such decisions seemed
to be based on political expedience and laterjustified by adjusting subsidies." Lovins, supra note 52, at
481.
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always recall what was said in 1914 of the old Balance of Power: meant to
deter, it did deter ninety-nine times; but on its hundredth use, it failed.
Nuclear war would be the ultimate political employment of, and
impact upon, energy and the environment. But politics has other
dramatic possibilities. For instance, there is no instant prospect of a
physical absence of oil and natural gas in the world within the decade of the
1980s. At the closing of the 1970s, there is a glut that has created problems
of high price maintenance for OPEC. While a contraction of world oil
supply could occur in the mid-1980s, the physical resource will continue to
be present in large quantities. But will it be sufficiently and continuously
available for use through that period?
That will depend upon politics. Politics will be especially important
because the location of oil is concentrated in a few countries, while use and
dependency tends to be concentrated in a few others. A religious upheaval
in Iran, a coup in Saudi Arabia, a renewed Arab war with Israel-these are
the sort of political events that can abruptly interdict the bulk of the
world's oil supply.
In 1973, the Arab oil embargo was relatively brief and incomplete.
At that time the oil purchasers could meet the difficulty with reallocations
of uses and price increases. But reliance upon oil from Arab and Iranian
sources has grown since 1973 despite the North Sea and Alaskan North
Slope fields.75
If, on another occasion, the Islamic countries where oil is principally
located should mount a protracted embargo, price rises and reallocations
would not be enough. Rationing would become necessary simply to
assure oil products to parts of the economy that otherwise would be unable
to obtain them. The preservation of the existing social order would re-
quire no less.
Undoubtedly, rationing eventually would indirectly cause prices to
rise and would divert a large volume of money into illegitimate channels.
But rationing has the appearance of providing equal treatment. It masks
many of the real rises in the costs of commodities since, under law, goods
are supposedly available in fixed amounts and for fixed prices. Instituting
rationing removes pressure from the domestic political leadership for a
long period of time by encouraging political distractions over the
operations of the rationing system itself.
76
Experience with the fixing of energy prices at levels that are low
relative to other commodity charges, such as the legal setting of natural gas
prices in the interstate United States' market since 1954, shows the
difficulty of raising energy prices. Given the importance of energy, who
75. For predictions on oil supply and continued substantial Mideast dependence, see Patterns of
World Oil Supply, in WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 32 (Exxon Background Series Pamphlet) (April 1978).
76. Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequality, in TIlE Ecoo ic APPROACH TO PUBLIC
POLICY: SELECTED READINGS 276, 281-82 (1976). Some are enthusiastic about the benefits of
rationing. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 26, at xv.
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would not want any part of it that they could get at prices lower than others
were paying for it or at prices that kept energy costs low when compared
with all other costs in the market? The ultimate issue is whether cheap
energy exists. The desire for cheap energy will never be in doubt.
7
"
A long-sustained embargo of oil would probably trigger oil rationing,
undoubtedly at fixed prices. At the very least, large oil-purchasing
countries would seek to buffer parts of their economic and social systems
by two-tier energy allocation and price-fixing schemes. 78 The political
ease of rationing, whatever its economic shortcomings, makes it the more
likely recourse. It would be among the first legal responses to the ripple
effect of, say, a long-term Arab-Iranian oil embargo.
This would not be the only effect, of course. Such a legal device as
rationing would be important to the legal, political, social, and economic
systems of countries dependent in whole or in part on Arab-Iranian oil.
But it would likely be of far less consequence than some of the ecologic
effects of an abruptly imposed energy shortage.
Many of the environmentally protective requirements enacted into
law in the 1970s themselves use energy. Catalytic converters for auto-
mobile exhausts, stack controls, and waste cleaners are all energy users.
Should energy sources for sustaining general economic activity be in
short supply, the temptation would be great to return to the earlier practice
of passing costs off onto the environment as a free good. The number of
catalytic converters detached in the United States in the 1973 gasoline
shortage offered evidence of this sort of reaction. It is probable that the
overall decline in the use of energy imposed by an Arab-Iranian oil
embargo would not counteract the environmentally deleterious effect of
the economically "practical" man disconnecting the pollution control
devices or resuming the use of previously forbidden fuels."
The world, as can be perceived by any casual television viewer, has a
high dependence upon Arab-Iranian oil. Potential political events in the
near future, and the probable exhaustion of that resource by the year 2025,
77. Hitch, Energy in Our Future, 43 Pill BETA KAPPA KEY REP., Summer 1978, at 2-4, 8.
78. In that situation a country like Norway, with its North Sea fields, would be in a relatively
better position compared to other Western countries. But as Bjartmar Gjerde, Norwegian Minister of
Oil and Energy expresses it:
Our experience since 1974 has shown us that the [expected mod.-rate] ceiling will never be
reached from [Norwegian] fields already discovered and declared commercial. . . . [After
1987] the production profile will start declining and fall rapidly unless further discoveries are
made. . . . The international recession, which all Western countries are experiencing at the
moment, makes one doubt the validity of assumptions made in 1974. . . . Weare nowliving
in a totally different economic situation and there is widespread uncmployment for important
groups in our community. . . . Petroleum activities therefore are not very suitable for
balancing a difficult economic situation.
ORGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES NEWS BULLETIN, April 1978, at 33,
79. "iTlhe energy scene is probably the segment of the economy most heavily affected by
environmental policies and considerations. Safeguards, risk-reducers, delays, and stop-gap solutions
lead to cost. . . . [Wlhat to do about them is a political decision." Landsberg, Low-cost Abundant
Energy: Paradise Lost?, in ENERGY: USE, CONSERVATION, AND SUPPLY 3, 9 (A. Abelson ed, 1974).
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underscore the significance of this dependence."U Despite its importance,
the localized Arab-Iranian oil resource is simply one more example,
among many that could be set forth, of the concentrations of energy
reliance.
Steadily over the twentieth century, the organization of energy supply
has become more complex, more centralized, more vulnerable to
disruption, and more important to the survival of the economy and even of
human life. A protracted Arab-Iranian oil embargo is only one of the
scenarios that could be written about the interdiction of the energy
cascades, or the serious consequences that would thereby ensue, or what
the law would have to do to deal with those consequences. As Americans
know, severe weather alone-from hurricanes to blizzards-is enough to
cause a breakdown in the fragile structure of the present highly centralized
and complicated energy system.8'
No individual, no community, no national economy has security
apart from the maintenance of this brittle, fragile energy system. It is a
vulnerability greatly intensified by a nearly complete reliance upon fossil
fuels as the source of energy supply. One of the paradoxes of the present
situation is that a society with an accelerating, open-ended demand for
energy has come to depend on an energy source that is nonrenewable,
limited to paleolithic products stored within the earth's crust.82
For over a century, demands for energy have continued to rise in an
unprecedented curve. During that time, predictions have been made,
beginning with the economist Stanley Jevons in 1865, that the paleolithic
storehouse of one fossil fuel or another was about to be drawn down to
exhaustion."' Each time new discoveries and new technologies for
reworking energy sources have denied the accuracy of those prophecies.
Nevertheless, given the present (1) rate of rise in energy demand, (2)
difficulty in the discovery of new fossil fuel sources, (3) increase in
exploitation of known resources of fossil fuels, and (4) impact upon the
living and renewing environment of the burning of those fossil fuels, it is
evident some sort of energy crisis threshold is being reached because of this
massive reliance upon fossil fuels for energy. Whether the interdiction
eventually comes from politics, or physical exhaustion of the fuel source,
or inadequacy of the source to meet soaring demand, or inability of the
atmosphere and the biomass to handle the by-products of fossil-fueled
energy conversion, an interdiction seems to be unavoidable.8 4
80. Some say it is the foundation for a revival of Islam. Mazrui, supra note 62.
81. Energy Research: Alternative Strategies for Development of NAew Energy Technologiesand
their Implicationsfor the Federal Budget, CONG. BUDGET OFICE 1-2,9. (Background Paper No. 10)
(July 15, 1976).
82. Kneese, Natural Resources Policy. 1976-86, in 4 U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM 1976 TO
1986: PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS, AND PATTERNS-REsOURCES AND ENERGY 122, 136.46 (1976).
83. See E. MURPHY, supra note 22, at 46-48.
84. Despite what seems to be a world-wide consensus on an existence of an energy crisis and the
need for energy conservation, a single, uniform, world energy conservation system remains elusive.
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION, at x (J. Dunkerley ed. 1978).
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Since 1870, people have talked of energy sources that could be used
instead of fossil fuels. Of course, some of the proposed sources were what
the fossil fuels were replacing-wood, dung, windmills, and the
waterwheel. It could be anticipated that these would not be embraced
contemporaneously with their very replacement. Hydropower was the
exception, but it soon ran into apparently interlocked limitations. It was
believed that hydropower would necessarily withdraw large amounts of
land and water from other uses, natural and human. Simultaneously,
energy demand was rising at a rate that seemed insatiable by hydropower.
But apart from hydropower, and later nuclear power-neither of which
has yet provided more than a small percentage of the total energy supply-
energy sources to replace or supplement fossil fuels have not progressed
beyond the realm of discussion and experiment.85
Solar power, wind, the tides, geothermal steam, and ocean thermal
energy conversion fall in this category. Reams have been written about
their potential; successful experiments have repeatedly taken place;
occasional applications of some of these processes have occured-yet the
portion they contribute to the humanly managed energy supply system is
trifling. So trifling, that it is easy to overlook the major contributions of
sun, wind, tides, and thermal conversion to the sea of energy in which all
human activity floats. It is dispersed energy, but it is life supporting.
Until now, however, little of it has been channeled into practical
provision of electricity, space heating, or direct steam power.
86
The same is true of another widely discussed energy alternative,
hydrogen. For years, the prospects of a hydrogen economy have been
held up as a tempting goal. Hydrogen is ostensibly endlessly available in
nature. It is now capable of being carried in nonexplosive form, usable for
mobile as well as stationary sources, yet the hydrogen economy remains
distant.
Large-scale use of the biomass seems equally remote. Some would
use it to make methane, in a partial, sophisticated harking back to the use
of dung for fuel. Others would make alcohol from vegetable matter.
Brazil, to save foreign exchange, is in fact using alcohol made from sugar
cane and cassava to mix with gasoline. The United States has
experimented with corn and could distill alcohol from locust, a crop
suitable for otherwise nonagricultural land.87 Nevertheless the biomass,
like the hydrogen economy, has had a negligible impact in reducing
dependency on fossil fuels.
85. Amory Lovins offers evidence that locally, changes have proceeded beyond this level,
Lovins, supra note 52, at 489-93. The Solar Energy Industries Association in 1977 claimed President
Carter's solar goals could easily be met by 1985 in terms of technology. R. LIVINGSTON, SOLAR
ENERGY: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT 48-49 (Report to the Solar Energy Research Institute,
Feb. 17, 1978).
86. N. GEORGESCu-ROEGEN, supra note 13, at 10-12.
87. A survey of such technologies can be found in ENERGY: USE, CONSERVATION, AND SUPPLY
107 (A. Abelson ed. 1974), and in Lovins, supra note 52, at 477, 511-17.
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Far more effort has gone into attempts to expand the traditional fossil
fuel resource.a First, drilling has been undertaken at sites where
predictions for success have been poor, on the chance that the geologists
could be wrong. Second, drilling has been undertaken in areas of high
cost and high risk; with expansion into the seabed of the North Atlantic, it
can be expected to continue.89 Third, repeated efforts have been made to
extract oil from shale and tar sands, for which costs seem perpetually to
establish a retreating target: when oil was $2.50 per barrel, advocates of
shale oil said shale would be an economic oil source should oil reach $8 per
barrel; yet, with oil at a world price of $13 per barrel people now say shale
could be economical with oil at perhaps twice that price. 90 Fourth, there
have been the schemes to gasify and liquefy coal in order to turn a more
plentiful fossil fuel into one of the scarcer kinds; again, the effort demands
energy and capital in amounts that make the attempt more economic only
as OPEC increases the price of oil. 9'
Certainly efforts to increase the fossil fuel resources, like those to
conserve its use and increase its efficiency, will continue. No one could
deny their value. Many would question some of them in terms of the
capital, energy, and environmental investments required relative to the
volume of energy to be obtained for profitable employment.92
More significantly, many are now claiming that it is urgent that we
actively develop alternative energy sources to the fossil fuels. They argue
that the current high-energy demandant society is well into what must be a
period of transition to some nonfossil fuel energy source, if this society is to
avoid eventual disaster. Advocates of nuclear power, "soft-energy paths,"
and the hydrogen economy seem to be in solid agreement on this point.9
Amory Lovins, who coined the term "soft-energy paths," advocates
the use of solar, wind, and biomass power for several reasons. He believes
them ecologically the least harmful energy sources and, in the long run,
truly inexhaustible springs for the energy cascades. He also believes that,
by creating an energy dependence upon current as opposed to stored
88. Some of these are described in ENERGY: USE, CONSERVATION, AND SUPPLY, supra note 87, at
70-88.
89. See The Offshore World of Oil and Gas, 2 PANHANDLERS MAGAZINE 2-6 (1978);
Geopressured Aquifers-A New Source of Natural Gas, 2 PANHANDLERS MAGAZINE 14-20 (1978).
90. See the prices in Metz, Oil Shale: A Huge Resource of Low-Grade Fuel, in ENERGY: UsE,
CONSERVATION, AND SUPPLY 70 (A. Abelson ed. 1974).
91. Even if capitally possible, if coal became the sole energy source at projected rates ofincrease.,
there would only be enough for 140 years of use according to one estimate. Cloud, Mineral Raw
Materials and the National Welfare, 4 U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM 1976 To 1986: PROSPECTS,
PROBLEMS, AND PATrERNs-REsOURCES AND ENERGY 56 (1976).
92. Pirages, U.S. Growth and the International Economy, in 12 U.S. ECONOMIC GRowmi ROm
1976 To 1986: PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS, AND PATTERNS-ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT 16, 32-34 (1977).
93. Id. See also Lovins, supra note 63, among others on solar power. Hammond,
Unconventional Energy Sources: Brazil Looks for Applications, 195 SCIENcE 862 (1977), discussing
alcohol and hydrogen; Rose, Nuclear Eclectic Power, in ENERGY: USE, CONSERVATION, AND SUPPLY,
88, 95-96 (A. Abelson ed. 1974), discussing nuclear versus fossil fuel power.
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resources, upon renewable as opposed to exhaustible resources, upon
dispersed as opposed to centralized resources, and upon locally
manageable as opposed to complex centralities of resources, the world will
be freed from the present fragile, highly vulnerable energy system.94
Such decentralization and noncomplexity of management need not
mark all energy systems that are alternatives to fossil fuels. One doubts if
this could be the case for a hydrogen economy or some types of biomass
energy sources. But in the present state of the ait, the employment of
individual, neighborhood, or very localized community efforts would
probably have to become standard for energy coming from sun, wind, and
most geothermal sources.
95
At the moment, technology also does not confer upon alternative
energy systems of the "soft path" all of the "at command" conveniences of
fossil fuel and nuclear energy, the "hard path." But technology is
improving, and the costs of fossil fuels are rising. "At command" amenity
may become accessible in a way unknown to persons who remember
heating a little hot water on the roof or lighting the home with a windmill
on the eaves. The price may also become "right." Present full
convenience or not, currently competitive price or not, the argument is
being put forth very strongly that what the world needs is self-reliance, in
the form of an energy system that could not be fatally interdicted nor used
to hold mankind for ransom by politicians, terrorists, strikers, speculators,
or resource exhaustion.
96
Some believe such a shift must be accomplished very soon. Others
think there is as much as a half century for a change from fossil fuel and
nuclear power to such current energy sources as the sun, wind, and
biomass. During that half century, there would continue to be heavy,
although constantly diminishing, reliance upon fossil fuel. But increasing
numbers of critics of the current energy system believe that the time to
begin the shift away from the fossil fuels is overdue by a decade. They
insist that the transition must be started soon and carried through
vigorously. 97
Although they may be right, there is little existing evidence of a
94. A. LovINs, SoFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE (1977).
95. Asbury & Mueller, Solar Energy and Electric Utilities: Should They Be Interfaced?, 195
SCIENCE 445 (1978). Geothermal power can be tied into an electricity grid. Stone & MeNamara,
Geothermal Energy and the Law, at xi (University of Southern California Law Center with the support
of the National Science Foundation (RANN)) (Sept. 30, 1975).
96. Amory Lovins summarizes it thusly:
Energy supply by a centralized entity . . may increase convenience to users who do not
care to become involved except by paying the bill, but may cause others to feel a humiliating
and even alienating dependence on remote technical bureaucrats who tell them how much
energy they can have at what price, and can disconnect them if they argue.
Lovins, supra note 52, at 488.
97. William Ophuls is particularly ofthe opinion that the situation requires immediate redress to
far lower levels of population, energy, materials use, and environmental demand. W. OPIIlUS, upra
note 28.
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political will to institute energy changes. There is political reluctance even
to take the steps toward maximizing the recovery of fossil fuels.
Politically, there has been a willingness to adopt laws mandating energy
conservation and efficient energy use-spaced over much of the decade of
the 1980s. This deferral is not dissimilar to the postponing of the
attainment of statutory goals for air and water quality. There has,
however, been great reluctance to require any greater changes or impose
greater costs for the better discovery, recovery, and use of fossil fuels.
The multi-tier pricing system for oil and natural gas in the United
States is evidence of this. The political pressure to keep prices low has
proved to be so strong that measures that might have facilitated a greater
domestic supply have resisted enactment and vigorous enforcement. The
producers, pursuing ends familiar to Adam Smith, have drifted to the
areas in which regulation allows the higher return. 98
For oil, the economic inducements have been found in importation of
foreign oil and secondary and tertiary recovery from previously exploited
domestic fields. In the case of natural gas, the inducements have been so
strong in the previously noncontrolled intrastate market that by late 1978
intrastate prices were dropping, even as gas for the interstate market, kept
by federal regulation at consistently lower prices, remained hard to find.
In regard to coal, the resistance remains strong among users of high-
sulphur coal to avoid meeting the federally imposed requirements to clean
up emissions and reduce the ambient levels of aerosols of sulphur. Across
the board, no one wants the onus of raising the price of fossil fuels,
whatever the energy and environmental justifications.
One fact that has become evident through all this energy and
environmental action over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s has been the
increasing importance of legal intervention. In the 1960s the political
scientist Lynton K. Caldwell insisted that nothing would happen on behalf
of the environment if Congress did not adopt "action-forcing" legisla-
tion. 99 The earlier Taft-Barkley Water Pollution Control Act (1948),10°
and the Clean Air Act (1963)1'0 which had been modeled on it, had been
ineffective. Caldwell-of course along with others-was persuasive
among key senators.
Suddenly, the National Environmental Policy Act (1969-1970),1O2 the
Air Quality Act (1970), and the Water Quality Act (1972)-all clearly
"action-forcing" upon both the federal and state governments and private
industry-came forth as federal statutes. So, too, for recent federal
energy legislation, although its "action-forcing" character has been far
98. Anyone regularly reading CCH Energy Management's reports on current activity, in my
opinion, would be hard-pressed to reach a different conclusion.
99. L. CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE FOR MODERN SOCIETY xiii (1970).
100. Pub. L. No. 80-845,62 Stat. 1155 (codified at33 U.S.C. §§466g-1, 1151-60,1171-75(1948)).
101. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1963)).
102. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970)).
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more passive. 103 Indeed, but for the "action-forcing" price rises of the
OPEC cartel, the subject of energy conservation would have made even
less than its present progress beyond the talk stage.
Still, the crises in energy, like those in the environment, have long
been present. All that recent events have accomplished over the years
since 1960 has been to make those crises more evident in the public mind.
Nothing is more "action-forcing" than a perceived need for social salva-
tion.
There is no reason to believe that such legal intervention will not
continue. If there should occur a movement from highly centralized,
complexly managed energy source and distribution systems to simple and
local systems, there would be a necessary relocation of capital and
economic activity. 10 4 Much law concerning the regulated utilities would
become obsolete. A new focus for law-perhaps even a reduced quantity
of legal regulation-would have to be considered.
Nevertheless, this present world society continues to demand high
quantities of energy. It will likely continue to do so, although energy
demand must eventually be reduced. High energy uses necessarily impact
upon the limited capacities of natural systems. For these, if for no other
reasons, laws concerning energy use and environmental protection will
continue in active force. They will be further extended under almost every
conceivable likelihood.'0 5
But "conceivable likelihood" is the limitation upon all prediction.
The law is not an end in itself. It is a process, mostly a reactive one, for
attaining ends externally assigned to law by some social means.10 6
The exact future for energy and environmental uses cannot be drawn
up in a grand design today. As a consequence, the precise future patterns
of law relative to those subjects are equally impossible to draft. Demand
and the organization of supply and its delivery are variables that will
determine both social and political choices. The reaction and the
application of law will reflect the use and the likely interdictions of fossil
fuels. The only choice for the present lies in degrees of probability, with
103. The recently passect National Energy Plan seems to fit such a pattern. Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617 (Nov. 9, 1978); Energy Production and
Conservation Tax Incentive Act, Pub. L. No. 95-618 (Nov. 9, 1978); National Energy Conservation
Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619 (Nov. 9, 1978); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-620 (Nov. 9, 1978); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621 (Nov. 9, 1978). For a
summary of the National Energy Plan, see [1978] ENERGY MANAGEMENT (CCH) 9420.
104. It might not be an aggregated capital crisis but if the specific industry suffering a capital
shortage is all or part of the energy industry, the ripple effect could be profound. See Bosworth, The
Issue of Capital Shortage, 3 U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM 1976 TO 1986; PROSPEMCrS, PRODLtLS,
AND PATTERNS-CAPITAL 1-15 (1976).
105. See VanVactor, Energy Conservation in the OECD: Progress and Results, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION 165-75 (J. Dunkerley ed. 1978), for general re-
marks on energy conservation.
106. See the remarks of Friedman, The Future as an Element of Present Action, in RLrHACKINO
AMERICA: A THEORY OF TRANSACTIVE PLANNING 13741 (1973).
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the assurance that far more is possible in the way of legal innovation.10 7
In the time frame of the years until 2030, it is probable that energy
demand will reluctantly slacken. A heavy dependence upon fossil fuels
will continue to be maintained. The impact of converting fossil fuels to
energy will impose growing problems upon the environment. Atthesame
time, it is probable that there will be some increase in the use of fissioned
nuclear power and, around the turn of the century, the introduction of the
fusion process for the conversion of energy.
It is probable that a major shift will occur toward other energy
sources, such as hydrogen, methane, the biomass, and the sun. Unless,
however, the present attention to these sources dramatically rises, it will be
the end of the century before they will substitute for fossil fuels in
significant amounts. The fixities, commitments, resistances, and
prejudices of the contemporary energy system are the bases for this
prediction of probabilities' 08
It seems likely, therefore, that the law must be prepared for certain
consequences. The environment is not going to enjoy automatic
improvements. Any human responsibility will require an increased
number of artificial regimes in order to assist natural systems to sustain
viable balances. The energy system will long remain centralized and
complex, with concomitant fragility. Interdictions-from nature,
politics, resource insufficiency, or technical inadequacy under the burden
of soaring demand-will likely increase, imposing greater social,
economic, and political difficulties. Serendipity, in short, will not bless
those who create open-ended demands for energy.
What can be expected of the law, under such circumstances? If those
drafting it do not hold themselves in readiness for change, legal systems
could add their collapse, or lesser difficulties, to the overall crises.' 9 One
must remember, after all, that the conditions of energy and the
environment are not the only subjects of crises with which societies and
their legal systems must deal between now and 2030.
Fixity, resistance, and prejudice in the legal system are least tolerable
when their presence elsewhere in the social apparatus is creating conditions
107. The relevant sort of recommendations are among those made by Willis Harman and
Thomas C. Thomas of Stanford Research Institute:
(2) Institute strong incentives for conservation of energy and materials, and for development
of "appropriate technology" that is no more demanding of resources and the environment
than necessary. . . . Promote decentralization of technology, institutions, and govern-
ment. . . . (3) Keep energy and growth policies somewhat flexible. . . . Encourage legiti-
mating alternative perceptions of social and economic reality.
Harman & Thomas, The Challenges of Non-econondc Factors to Economic Growth, in 2 U.S.
ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM 1976 To 1986: PROSPECTS, PROBLEMS, AND PATTERNs-TIIE FACTORS AND
PROCESSES SHAPING LONG-RuN EcoNoMIc GROWTH 41, 58 (1976).
108. On the continued role of lag time, see Long & Schipper, Resources and Energy
Substitution, in 4 U.S. EcONoMIc GROWTH FROM 1976 TO 1986: PROSPECTS, PROBLES tS, A. D
PATTERNS-RESOURCES AND ENERGY 94, 98-100 (1976).
109. See America's Energy Crisis: Summary Report (A.B.A. Special Comm. on Energy Law)
(August 1978).
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of crisis. The legal system alone probably can save no society from its
perils, but inadequacies at law may increase those perils to a socially
insoluble degree.
There need not be more regulation or control by bureaucrats of
everyday life; 1 ° law has other options than the bureaucratic command.
The law may redefine property, establish new terms of resource specificity,
set the conditions for the transfer of or the taking of security in property,
and create or modify causes of action, defenses, or the conduct of
adversary proceedings. The last are not so simple in appearance as a
prosecutable prohibition or so tangible as a bureaucrat with rubber stamps
somewhere in an office. Still, they are equally available options."'
Probably every resource of the law-criminal prosecution, adminis-
trative command, and changes in the rules of property-should be drawn
upon in the future. To neglect any resource will likely have results more
consequentially malign than benign. This particularly shall ensue when
the situation is socially perilous.
Who can today deny the perils from open-ended economic demand,
high energy dependence on the fossil fuels, and the many limitations these
find in the environment? "Business as usual" on these terms cannot
continue. The changes forced by the present intervention of the law, with
its costs and restraints, are not enough to turn future practice to a better
course.
Furthermore, for the next fifty years and beyond, the needs relative to
energy and the environment will have massive, preempting requirements
for capital. Those who are deprived of capital for other, competing uses
will be reluctant to accept this preemption. Nevertheless, it will be
essential that cultural and political conditions not be allowed to make this
direction of capital toward energy and environmental concerns an
impossibility. The effective operation of law will be one of the means to
that end.
Already the perception of these difficulties has been popularly evident
for at least a decade. The law has responded with important and helpful
changes. Yet nothing has been solved, and only a little has been saved by
these legal measures. Important as they are to the point of indispensabili-
ty, these legal enactments will be only a part of a continuum of legal ac-
tion.
Demand remains both undifferentiated and open-ended. Energy use
continues to soar and retains its dependence on fossil fuels. It remains
something that cannot be aggregated into a unified energy budget, to
110. H. KAHN, W. BROWN & L. MARTEL, THE NExT 200 YEARS: A SCENARIO FOR AMuRtCA AND
THE WORLD 196-97 (1976). Maybe Herman Kahn is right. He claims government jobs will be only a
kind of public welfare. Bureaucrats will be even less relevant to assigned duties if he should be right
than they are presently.
Ill. See E. MURPHY, NATURE, BUREAUCRACY, AND TIlE RULES OF PROPERTY: REGULATING TIlE
RENEWING ENVIRONMENT (1977), for an effort to explore these various possibilities.
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predictably offset energy investment with the energy product from the
conversion.' 1 2  The environment continues to deteriorate under these
impacts, despite efforts made and successes attained. These and other
conditions being so, the work of the law is not finished. It has scarcely
begun.
If more is to be done that to phenomenologically describe conditions,
and if efforts other than the complete dismantling of the present
technology and economy can be productively undertaken, then a future
role remains for the law. It will be sweeping in its scope. To predict less
would be to prophesy the improbable. To predict more precisely is to
know the future in a detail that transcends a primary concern with law and
requires the more mystic attributes of prophesy. And to predict anything
at all is to know the limits of human mortality.'
3
112. Huettner, Net Energy Anat'sis: An Economic Assessment, 192 SCIENCE 101 (1976).
113. Herman Kahn calls it writing scenarios. Kenneth E. F. Watt calls it "games for decision-
makers." K. WATT, THETITANIC EFFECT. PLANNING FOR TIE UN7IIINKABLE237 (1974). Dennis Gabor
calls it "inventing the future." D. GABOR, INVENTING TIlE Future (1963). C.A. Doxiadis calls it
"legislating against great urban crimes." C. A. DOXIADIS, TilE GREAT URBAN CRI.wES WE PE'IIT BY
LAw (1973). Buckminster Fuller talks of discovering "the synergetic rules that evolution
is ... trying to make clear to us." R. FULLER, OPERATING MANUAL FOR SPACESHIP EARMh 133
(1969).
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